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Abstract 
 
While a significant amount of scholarly literature has been written on whether ethnic 
lobby influence has a positive or negative impact on U.S. foreign policy, what has not 
been well explored is the way these ethnic lobbies are organized to influence policy, 
whether the organizational structure successfully advances their objectives, and the 
potential for future successful ethnic lobby influence through changing administrations.   
To achieve these objectives, this investigation develops a case study around Indian-
American lobbying efforts in the United States, particularly that of the U.S.-India 
Political Action Committee (USINPAC).  It analyzes what has been deemed as 
USINPAC’s recent success in influencing Congress with regard to passage of the U.S.-
India Nuclear Deal and uses the Deal as a starting point to examine how such a success 
occurred and postulate whether this success foreshadows continuing influence in the 
future.  It is clear that, due to its organizational strength, USINPAC did indeed play a role 
in influencing passage of the Deal and has the capacity to influence U.S. congressional 
policy in the future.  However due to the ambiguities inherent in the Deal, it will be up to 
the Obama administration to follow through on the commitments of the Deal.  Thus, what 
lies ahead for this lobby will be, in large part, contingent upon future administrations’ 
decisions about how they will treat the U.S.-India partnership. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The majority of existing scholarly literature on ethnic lobbies and American 
foreign policy focuses on whether ethnic lobby influence has a positive or negative effect 
on U.S. foreign policy.  While some argue that “the negative consequence of ethnic 
involvement may well outweigh the undoubted benefits [such] activism at times confers 
on America in world affairs,”1 others defend ethnic lobbies: “ethnic lobbies have 
passionate critics because of the lurking suspicion that they put the interests of their 
ancestral homeland before those of the United States.”2 This topic has been debated time 
and again, producing two divergent camps unlikely to agree in the near future.  However, 
what has not been well explored is the way these ethnic lobbies are organized to 
influence policy, whether the organizational structure successfully advances their 
objectives, and the potential for future successful ethnic lobby influence through 
changing administrations.  When existing literature has aimed to answer these questions, 
it has generally focused on communities such as Jewish and Cuban Americans.  This 
analysis aims not only to examine some of these unexplored questions, but also to focus 
on a little-discussed ethnic group, Indian-Americans.    
To achieve these objectives, this investigation develops a case study around 
Indian-American lobbying efforts in the United States.  It analyzes what has been deemed 
a recent success in influencing Congress with regard to passage of the U.S.-India Nuclear 
Deal and uses the Deal as a starting point to examine how such a success occurred and 
postulate whether this success foreshadows continuing influence in the future. 
                                                 
1
 Tony Smith, Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of  
 American Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000) 1-2. 
2
 James M. Lindsay “Getting Uncle Sam’s Ear: Will Ethnic Lobbies Cramp America’s  
 Foreign Policy Style?” Brookings Review 12 Dec. 2002: 40. 
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 CHAPTER 1—Coming into Being: Maturation of India-American 
Mobilization and Inception of the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal 
 
I. BACKGROUND: INDIAN POPULATION EXPANSION IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
In order for an ethnic population to mobilize in favor of a cause, it is crucial that 
this population be well-established in its country of residence.  For Indian-Americans, 
this has only recently been the case.  It was not until the 1965 Immigration and 
Nationality Act that the Indian population in the United States began to expand.  
However, once this population did begin to grow, the background of those individuals 
who emigrated and their choice of state in which to settle paved the way for the Indian-
American political mobilization that would arise as this ethnic population began to 
emerge. 
Coming to America: Setting the Stage for Political Mobilization  
 
The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act represented a watershed moment for 
all ethnic populations in the United States, but especially for Indian-Americans.  The Act 
abolished the national-origin quotas that had been in place since 1924, thereby permitting 
the entry of many more immigrants.  However, the act also specified a preference for 
professionals and scientists.  This gave Indians several advantages in immigrating to the 
United States.  From 1947-1964, Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s Prime Minister, had 
developed industrializing policies, many of which were geared toward building world- 
class institutions of higher education.  These policies resulted in an educated Indian 
population with a high proportion of professionals who were permitted to emigrate.  
Furthermore, due to the British colonial occupation of India, many of these professionals 
spoke excellent English, giving them an additional advantage over other ethnic groups 
that immigrated to the United States.   
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 Due to theses emigration advantages, the Indian population in the United States 
expanded rapidly.  Between 1960 and 1980, it grew from under 9,000 to over 387,000.  
By 1990 the Indian population had reached 815,000 and by 2000 it approached 1.7 
million.3  While the average growth rate for the United States was only 7.6 per cent from 
1990 to 2000, the overall growth rate for Indians was 105.87 per cent.4  Today, there are 
over 2.5 million Indian-Americans in the United States and the population continues to 
increase rapidly.  In fact, emigration from India is currently at its highest point. 5 
 It remains the case that Indians emigrating today are still those who are highly 
educated.  In his book The World is Flat, Thomas Friedman describes such a 
phenomenon as the “brain drain.”6 Because the United States has traditionally been ripe 
with opportunity, it has been advantageous for well-educated Indians to come to America 
to secure better jobs and provide themselves with greater opportunity.*  This highly 
educated community gives Indian-Americans an advantage over other ethnic groups in 
mobilizing politically because they are viewed in America as an intelligent and credible 
population. 
 Indians in the United States also tend to be concentrated in certain states and 
regions.  The U.S. states with the largest Indian-American populations include: 
California, New York, New Jersey, Texas, and Illinois.  Furthermore, the cities with the 
highest concentration of Indian-Americans include: New York City, Chicago, 
                                                 
*Note: Due to the economic crisis in the United States, Indian-Americans are currently less likely to come 
to the U.S. and many Indian-Americans are returning to India. 
³Sandhya Shukla, India Abroad: Diasporic Cultures of Postwar America and England (Princeton,  
 NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003) 269. 
4
 “S0201.  Selected Population Profile in the United States: 2005.  Asian Indian alone or in any  
combination.  American Community Survey.” American FactFinder. 2005. Bureau of Census.  
Web. 10 November 2008. 
5
 United States. Homeland Security: Office of Immigration. Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 
 Fiscal Years 1820 to 2006. Washington: GPO, 2006.    
6
 Thomas Friedman, The World is Flat (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2005) 128.  
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Washington-Baltimore, Philadelphia, Houston, Dallas-Fort Worth, Detroit, Boston, 
Atlanta, Los Angeles, and the Bay Area.  While Indians initially settled on the West 
Coast, the concentration of Indian-Americans today is much higher in those cities not on 
the West Coast.  This has been crucial in their ability to influence policy as they can exert 
influence on congressmen across a wide arena whose districts include a significant 
proportion of Indian-Americans. 
 The combination of a rapidly expanding population, its highly educated nature, 
and the geographic spread of this ethnic group in the United States has eased the process 
of breaking into the political sphere with the purpose of influencing policy.  However, the 
ways in which Indian-Americans initially mobilized politically proved to be less effective 
than desired.  
 
II. FROM FRAGMENTATION TO CONSOLIDATATION: INDIAN-AMERICAN 
MOBILIZATION  
 
As Indians began immigrating to the United States, they were most concerned 
with settling into the new culture, adjusting to their new jobs and making a home for their 
families.  However, after the initial period of adjustment, many Indians began to feel that 
their interests were not being represented in the policies pursued by the United States 
government.  For this reason, Indian-Americans began to mobilize.  They rallied behind 
two different groups, each trying to influence policy in a unique way.  The first group 
was a religious identity group aiming to promote a Hindu vision.  The second group was 
a pan-ethnic identity group wanting to expound a South Asian vision.  The pan-ethnic 
group reached a larger percentage of the Indian population because it included 
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occupational groups and Indian professional associations.7  Additionally, both the South 
Asian and Hindu groups generally include large numbers of Indians from a Hindu 
background, and therefore, it is not religious affiliation that distinguishes the two groups.  
Instead, the two groups derive their differences from diverse conceptions of 
‘Indianness’—a secular, multi-religious, and multi-cultural vision of India versus a Hindu 
centric one.8 
Appropriate Ways to Mobilize 
 
 It is probable that Indian-Americans formed both Hindu and South Asian groups 
because they felt these were acceptable constructs under which to garner support for their 
respective ethnic group’s ideas and concerns.  Rallying behind either a religion or a pan-
ethnic vision is viewed as a respectable approach to promoting an agenda for the 
betterment of one’s ethnic population while still showing loyalty to one’s country of 
residence, in this case the United States.9  For this reason, it is not surprising that Indian-
Americans rallied around either a religious or a pan-ethnic identity to promote their 
agenda.   
Hindu Mobilization 
 
 Indian-Americans who associated with the Hindu identity group began to 
mobilize politically in the 1990s.  This identity group generally believes in a conception 
of India as a Hindu country under attack from and therefore hostile to Muslims, as well 
as, to a lesser degree, Christians and secularists.10  This conception of India manifested 
itself in the Hindutva movement, a movement advocating Hindu nationalism.  In India, 
                                                 
7
 Prema Kurien, “Who Speaks for Indian American? Religion, Ethnicity, and Political 
  Formation,” American Quarterly 3 Sept. 2007: 763. 
8
 Prema Kurien, “To be or not to be South Asian: Contemporary Indian American 
Politics,” Journal of Asian American Studies 3 Oct. 2003: 263. 
9Kurien (2003) 276. 
10
 Kurien (2007) 762. 
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Hindu nationalism emerged as a reaction to Western colonialism.  Proponents of this 
movement believe that invasions by the Muslims, and then the British diluted the Hindu 
culture and for this reason, it must restore the idea of India as a Hindu polity by rejecting 
religions such as Christianity and Islam. 11 This movement gained momentum among 
Indian-Americans in the 1990s when the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came to power in 
India at this time.  The central plank of the BJP platform in the 1980s was Hindu 
nationalism and therefore, when the BJP party assumed power, this movement caught fire 
among those Indian-Americans in the United States who supported the Hindu identity.  
There are two other possible reasons for the rise in support for the Hindutva movement in 
the U.S.  The first is the use of the internet and the second is the perceived need for 
resources and recognition.  The internet provided a way for Indians to quickly gain 
supporters and educate people about the Hindutva movement.12 Additionally, as Indians 
in the U.S. began to feel a greater need to pursue an agenda benefiting their community, 
they began to rally around Hindu nationalism.  It has been argued that this movement has 
become even more successful in the United States than in India because the religious 
minority feels it necessary to espouse its beliefs in order to keep its identity alive.13  
 Those Indian-Americans who associate with the Hindu identity group aim to 
influence policy that is directly linked to Hinduism.  They want to bring Hinduism to the 
attention of policy makers and draw attention to the difference between Hinduism and 
Islam.  In keeping with the distinction between Hinduism and Islam, they also try to show 
that India has nothing in common with Pakistan and Bangladesh, reinforcing the idea of 
India as essentially a Hindu polity.  A few of the groups that promote this Hindu vision 
                                                 
11
 Kurien (2003) 267. 
12
 Kurien (2007) 763. 
13
 Kurien (2003) 266. 
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include the World Hindu Council of America (VHPA) and the Hindu American 
Foundation (HAF).  VHPA’s website boasts a mission of promoting unity among Hindus, 
providing a forum for Hindu interests, and raising awareness about Hinduism through 
publications and media.14 Similarily, the HAF’s website states its mission as “interacting 
with and educating leaders in public policy, academia, media, and the public at large 
about Hinduism and global issues concerning Hindus…”15 Groups such as these have 
been able successfully to lobby for a Hindu priest to open a session of Congress for the 
first time in September 2000 and the recognition by President Bill Clinton of the Diwali 
holiday in October 2000.  While significant to these Hindu identity groups, these 
otherwise marginal successes reflect the groups’ inability to influence American policy 
on broader national issues. 
South Asian Mobilization 
 
 In contrast to the Hindu vision, those Indian-Americans who identify with a South 
Asian vision believe in a secular, multireligious and multicultural conception of India.  
They aim to demonstrate the importance of harmonious relationships between groups and 
countries in the Indian subcontinent.16  This movement began on college campuses in the 
1980s when Indian-Americans began to realize they had both a common heritage and a 
common concern, challenging the exclusion of the South Asian voice.  This group is 
interested in influencing policy by creating a progressive coalition against religious 
bigotry as well as a front against racial profiling in the United States.  A few of the 
organizations that have mobilized around a South Asian ideology are the Subcontinental 
                                                 
14
 VHP of America-World Hindu Council of America. Mission Statement; Accessed: Jan 2009.  
 <http://www.vhp-america.org/whatvhpa/mission.htm> 
15
 HAF-Hindu American Foundation. Mission Statement; Accessed: Jan. 2009.  
<http://www.hinduamericanfoundation.org/about.htm>  
16
 Kurien (2007) 763. 
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Institute, the Friends of South Asia (FOSA), as well as religious organizations such as the 
Indian-Muslim Americans and Indian-Christian Americans.  The Subcontinental Institute 
produces a journal called The Subcontinental which is geared toward both policy-makers 
as well as politically active South Asians.  It also aims to provide a forum for the 
development of South Asian American political identity.17 FOSA expounds a mission of 
achieving a peaceful, prosperous, and hate-free South Asia by bringing together people 
with roots in various parts of South Asia.18  As with Indian-Americans who mobilize in 
favor of a Hindu vision, those Indian-Americans who mobilize to effect policy through a 
South Asian vision have had minor successes in influencing policy, yet have not achieved 
success on broader foreign policy issues of interest to them.  
Problems with Mobilization 
 
 The most apparent problem with Indian-American mobilization in the United 
States thus far has been the fragmented way in which this ethnic group aims to influence 
policy.  While the Hindu identity group is concerned with lobbying for policies that 
promote Hinduism, the South Asian group is interested in promoting policies that 
preserve the equal treatment of all Indian people.  Each of these groups has a different 
conception of “Indianness.”19  Furthermore, not only are Indian-Americans fragmented 
between the Hindu and the South Asian visions, but they are also fragmented within these 
ideological spheres.  There are several different Hindu and South Asian groups, each 
trying to promote its agenda and influence policy in what it believes to be the best way 
possible.  This becomes problematic when trying to impact U.S. policy because too many 
                                                 
17
 The Subcontinental. Mission Statement; Accessed: Jan 2009.  
<http://www.thesubcontinental.org/public/institute.jsp> 
18
 FOSA-Friends of South India. Mission Statement; Accessed: Jan 2009.  
<http://www.friendsofsouthasia.org/about/> 
19
 Kurien (2007) 762. 
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voices simply detract from the political message a particular group is trying to promote.  
While it has been argued that it is possible for multiple ethnic lobby groups within a 
particular ethnic population to reinforce, rather than counter, each other, this does not 
seem to be the case with the Indian-American population.  Ethnic groups, such as 
Armenian-Americans, that have achieved such unity among their various ethnic lobbies 
tend to have similar policy objectives.20  Unfortunately, due to differing agendas and 
conceptions of how to influence policy, the Hindu and South Asian identity groups’ 
efforts have not reinforced each other’s desired policy aims.   
New Mobilization: Formation of USINPAC (2002) 
 
The founding of the US-India Political Action Committee (USINPAC) in 2002 
marked a new age for Indian-American political mobilization.  Breaking from the former 
Hindu and South Asian models, founder Sanjay Puri, also president of the US-India 
Business Alliance (USIBA), understood that to influence Congress on broader, more 
significant issues, Indian-Americans needed to rid their community of its fragmentation 
and consolidate its voice.  USINPAC was founded with a mission “to impact policy on 
issues of concern to the Indian-American community in the United States.”21  Unlike the 
Hindu or South Asian mobilization groups, USINPAC aims to influence policy on issues 
from immigration and anti-hate crime measures to US-India relations and 
entrepreneurship and business.  Its principle strategic objective is “to consolidate 
individual contributions by actively engaging with every politically active Indian-
American organization and individual via an effective platform to leverage the combined 
                                                 
20
 Heather S. Gregg, “Divided They Conquer: The Success of Armenian Ethnic Lobbies in the U.S.,” 
 Rosemary Rogers Working Paper Series, No. 13 (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of 
 Technology, 2002) 10. 
21
 USINPAC-US India Political Action Committee. Mission Statement; Accessed: Oct. 2008.  
 <www.usinpac.com\mission_objective.asp> 
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strength of contributor and community concerns.”22 This lobby has tried to bridge the 
differences between the fragmented groups within the Indian-American community by 
reaching out to every group and addressing the concerns most important to its members.  
It is the “most active and least fractionalized” of the Indian-American lobbying 
organizations.23  By consolidating the Indian-American voice into one overarching 
platform, USINPAC has tried to influence U.S. foreign policy on a grander scale.  
Additionally, this lobby has tried to garner bipartisan support in Congress, again 
demonstrating that USINPAC is truly focused on influencing those issues that are in 
keeping with its mission. 
 USINPAC has supported policies that are problematic for both the Hindu groups 
and the South Asian groups.  It does not favor one identity group or the other, but 
attempts to transcend the boundaries these groups created.  For example, USINPAC 
supported Bobby Jindal, an ethnic Indian, in his race for the governorship of Louisiana.  
This upset the Hindu mobilization groups because Jindal is a Christian.  USINPAC 
believes it is important for Indian-Americans to be represented in political offices and for 
this reason, Jindal’s candidacy was not about his religion, but about his ability to 
represent the Indian-American community.  Additionally, the Hindu groups were 
displeased when USINPAC did not speak to the Hindu perspective after the 2002 Gujarat 
riots.  These communal riots between Hindus and Muslims were portrayed by the media 
as state sponsored attacks by Hindu nationalists that drove Muslims from their homes to 
relief camps.  However, many Hindus claim that they were retaliating against a Muslim 
mob attack that bullied 57 young Hindu volunteers traveling on the Sabarmati Express 
                                                 
22
 USINPAC-US India Political Action Committee. Mission Statement. 
23
 Jason A. Kirk, “Indian-Americans and the U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement: Consolidation of an Ethnic  
Lobby?,” Foreign Policy Analysis July 2008: 291. 
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from Ayodhya—the disputed site of the Ram Janmabhoomi temple—when it stopped at 
Godhra, Gujarat. 
On the other hand, the fact that USINPAC has alliances with Zionist 
organizations is unacceptable to the South Asian groups because these Zionist groups are 
often opposed by Muslim organizations.  However, USINPAC has, in large part, 
patterned its organizational model on the Jewish lobby, so allying with these groups has 
been an important step in consolidating USINPAC’s success.  South Asian groups were 
also outraged by the fact that USINPAC did not stand up against the Patriot Act that 
permits the deportation of immigrants suspected of terrorism and, in a charged racial 
environment, could potentially affect Indian-Americans.   
Initial Indian-American political mobilization consisted of a split between those 
with a Hindu vision and others with a South Asian vision.  However, neither of these 
groups was particularly successful because of ideological and internal fragmentation.  
With the creation of USINPAC in 2002, Sanjay Puri aimed to bridge such divisions.  
Supporting neither a strictly Hindu nor South Asian vision, USINPAC aims to promote 
an agenda touching on many issues that affect the Indian-American community.  This 
lobby was formed to “create a ‘political brand’ that would represent Indian-Americans in 
Washington…and seems to be gaining the respect and admiration of the community.”24 
While this newfound respect from the Indian-American community has helped the lobby 
to consolidate its vision and begin to influence policy at the national level, the success of 
this lobby could not have occurred without the recent change in U.S.-India relations. 
 
 
                                                 
24
 Kurien (2007) 778. 
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III. THE PRESIDENTIAL INITIATIVE: WARMING OF UNITED STATES-
INDIA RELATIONS 
 
Relations between the United States and India have been consistently rocky.  
From an estranged Cold War relationship to the recent development of a “strategic 
partnership,” the change in U.S.-India relations has been one of ups and downs and 
continues to be unsettled due to changing administrations in both countries.  For this 
reason, the recent transformation in relations has been described as “one of the most 
significant developments in American foreign policy in the past decade.”25  
 Cold War Politics 
 
The Cold War years marked tense relations between the United States and India.  
Constant backstabbing throughout this period has made it difficult for these two countries 
to cooperate as they are each suspicious of the others’ intentions.  The tense relations 
between the United States and India began with the partition of British India and Indian 
independence in 1947 when the India-Pakistan rivalry was born.  This rivalry became 
exacerbated with India’s decision to pursue a policy of a non-alignment.  Because this 
policy precluded an alignment with the United States and consequently lead to a warmer 
relationship between India and the Soviet Union, the United States solicited help from 
Pakistan, deepening tensions between India and the United States.  The 1965 and 1971 
Indo-Pakistani wars again furthered the rift between India and the U.S.  During the 1971 
war, the United States supported Pakistan whose government acted as an intermediary in 
the U.S. opening to China, while the Soviet Union and India signed the Indo-Soviet 
Friendship Treaty during this same period.  The policies pursued by the United States 
during the Cold War alienated India and India’s friendly relations with the Soviet Union 
                                                 
25
 Kirk 275. 
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similarly made the United States wary of India’s intentions.   The legacy of these 
suspicions has complicated efforts after the Cold War by the two countries to cooperate 
on issues of national importance.   
The Clinton Era: Warming Begins with Mixed Signals 
 
The Clinton presidency ushered in the possibility of a new relationship with India.  
With the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, India’s primary 
trading partner at the time, India needed to diversify its options internationally.  For this 
reason, Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao visited the United States in 1994, marking 
the beginning of improved relations between India and the U.S.  Rao and President 
Clinton discussed a wide range of issues from human rights to nuclear nonproliferation, 
but the talks centered on economic cooperation. 26 Although this marked initial 
cooperation between India and the U.S., India’s nuclear tests created further tensions. 
In May 1998, both India and Pakistan conducted nuclear weapons tests.  India felt 
this was necessary due to threats represented by China’s nuclear capability, the ongoing 
border dispute with China, and Pakistan’s 1987 announcement that it had succeeded in 
making a nuclear bomb.  India felt continually vulnerable due to the ongoing border 
dispute which had erupted into a border war in 1962 after the Chinese pushed south of the 
McMahon Line.  What India felt as necessary nuclear tests further escalated tensions 
between the United States and India, thereby prompting the U.S. to invoke sanctions 
against India and work for a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).  However, these sanctions 
had modest effects on India’s economy which was largely insulted from external 
                                                 
26
 U.S. Congressional Research Service. India-U.S. Relations (IB93097; Nov. 4, 2004), by 
K. Alan Kronstadt. Text in: LexisNexis® Congressional Research Digital Collection; Accessed: 
Jan. 2009. <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/37996.pdf> 
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influence.  Consequently, in the months following the implementation of these sanctions, 
several legislative measures lifted many of the initial restrictions.27     
The next step in improved U.S.-India relations began in the latter months of the 
Clinton administration.  President Clinton spent several days in India in March 2000 
discussing topics such as economic ties, regional stability, nuclear proliferation, and 
counterterrorism.  Later that year Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited the United 
States and signed a joint agreement with President Clinton that outlined cooperation on 
arms control and terrorism. 28  
Watershed Moment: September 11, 2001 
 
While the relationship between the United States and India had begun to take on 
new meaning at the end of the Clinton administration, the events of September 11, 2001 
spurred an increasingly rapid change in the relations between the two countries.  The 
need for aid during the September 11th crisis brought new meaning to India’s willingness 
to help.  Although most sanctions that had been put in place following the 1998 nuclear 
tests had been removed in 2000, any remaining sanctions were lifted in October 2001.29 
This crisis also accentuated the policy adopted during the Clinton Administration to 
delink India and Pakistan.  During the Cold War period, there had been a tendency in 
U.S. policy to treat these two countries on parity and consider them relevant only within 
the South Asian region.  As Condoleezza Rice once stated: “there is a strong tendency 
conceptually [in the US] to connect India with Pakistan and to think only of Kashmir or 
                                                 
27
 U.S. Congressional Research Service. 4 Nov. 2004. 
28
 U.S. Congressional Research Service. 4 Nov. 2004. 
29
 Jane Perlez, “U.S. Ready to End Sanction on India to Build an Alliance,” New York  
 Times  27 Aug. 2001; Accessed: Jan. 2009: <http://www.indianembassy.org/ 
US_Media/2001/aug/U_S_%20Ready%20to%20End%20Sanctions%20on%20India%20to%20Bu
ild%20an%20Alliance.htm> 
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the nuclear competition between the two states.”30  Separating policies toward these two 
countries marked a huge step in the changing U.S. approach toward India.  The 
September 11th crisis was a defining moment that solidified what had been an already 
emerging trend—strategic cooperation between two countries that had been wary of the 
other due to past inconsistencies.     
The Bush Era: Consolidation of a Partnership 
 
The relationship between the U.S. and India continued to warm during the 
administration of George W. Bush.  After the Asian tsunami of December 2004, the 
United States and India worked closely to help with rescue operations and reconstruction 
efforts.  Similarly, after Hurricane Katrina in 2005, India donated five million dollars to 
the American Red Cross and sent several plane loads of supplies to the area.31 While 
these humanitarian efforts were significant, the transformation of the relationship 
between the United States and India began in earnest in July 2005, culminating in the 
U.S.-India Nuclear Deal in 2008.   
A joint statement aiming to “lift the U.S. moratorium on nuclear trade with India, 
provide U.S. assistance to India’s civilian nuclear energy program, and expand U.S.-
Indian cooperation in energy and satellite technology”32 was first announced on July 18, 
2005 after Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited the United States.  President 
Bush subsequently visited India in November 2006 to further discussions about the 
Nuclear Deal.  On December 18, 2006, President Bush signed into law the Hyde Act 
(H.R. 5682).  This Act amended the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954, thereby providing 
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India with the ability to purchase nuclear fuel and reactors from the U.S. and reversing a 
30 year moratorium on such transfers.33  Then, on July 27, 2007, the United States and 
India completed negotiations for the operative 123 article of the Hyde Act, Agreement for 
Cooperation between the Government of the United States of American and the 
Government of India Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.  The 123 Agreement 
called for each country to “cooperate extensively in the full development and use of 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as a means of achieving energy security, on a stable, 
reliable and predictable basis.”34  At the core of the Agreement was India’s Separation 
Plan to identify 14 civilian nuclear reactors to be placed under International Atomic 
Energy Association (IAEA) safeguards, while designating, at its own discretion, reactors 
and other research facilities for the military program outside the IAEA safeguards 
regime.  As Indian Prime Minister Singh noted, “New Delhi retains the sole right to 
determine such reactors as civilian…this means that India will not be constrained in any 
way in building future nuclear facilities, whether civilian or military, as per our national 
requirements.”35  The Separation Plan had to be “credible in the U.S. from the 
perspective of [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treat] (NPT) obligations not to ‘assist, 
encourage, or induce’ any non-nuclear weapon state to acquire nuclear weapons.  It had 
to be defensible in India from the perspective of protecting the military program by 
asserting New Delhi’s sovereign right to designate which of its reactors will be placed 
under safeguards, identifying only civilian nuclear facilities of ‘no national security 
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significance.’”36 To this end, the United States agreed to provide fuel for India’s civilian 
reactors and India agreed to reprocess U.S. origin fuel in a special facility under IAEA 
safeguards.   
A plan detailing specifics regarding the safeguards was then laid out under an 
India-specific Safeguards Agreement between India and the IAEA.  On August 18, 2008, 
the IAEA Board of Governors, with U.S. support, approved such an agreement which 
was signed by India on February 2, 2009.37  This Agreement provides for inspections of 
nuclear installations that India identified as “civilian” in its Separation Plan.  Due to the 
tireless work of President Bush, India was also subsequently granted an exemption to 
access the international market for civilian nuclear trade by the 45-nation Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG) on September 6, 2008.38  This waiver makes India the only 
country that is permitted to be a non-signatory of the NPT while still conducting nuclear 
commerce with other countries.  After nearly three years of negotiation, the final version 
of the Deal (H.R. 7081) was signed into law on October 8, 2008.*  While the Deal 
materialized as the result of a presidential initiative, it was by no means a foregone 
conclusion as the conditionalities in the final language indicate that opposition from 
nonproliferation advocates persisted until the end. 
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IV. THE US-INDIA NUCLEAR DEAL 
 
The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal, a controversial agreement aimed at the facilitation 
of nuclear cooperation between the United States and India, marks a pinnacle in the 
development of U.S.-India relations as well as a new perspective on nonproliferation 
standards.  The Deal has significant meaning for both countries and both India and the 
United States, for different reasons, were committed to its approval.  
Details of the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal 
 
 The United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation 
Enhancement Act was introduced on September 25, 2008.  It was passed in the House as 
H.R. 7081 on September 27, 2008 with 298 votes or 69% approval.  This was a bipartisan 
effort as 120 Democrats and 178 Republicans voted aye.  It was subsequently passed in 
the Senate as S. 3548 on October 1, 2008 with 85 aye votes or an 86% approval rate.  
Again, this was a bipartisan effort as 49 Republicans and 36 Democrats voted aye.  The 
Act became law with the signature of President George W. Bush on October 8, 2008.39  
As previously noted, from the inception of the 2005 joint statement to the final 
form of H.R. 7081, the Deal underwent several significant changes.  The original 
intention of the Deal, to provide full nuclear cooperation between India and the United 
States, has been pared down due to nonproliferation concerns.  “Specifically, the U.S. 
commitment in the 123 Agreement for providing full access to fuel for civil nuclear 
reactors offered for IAEA safeguards ‘in perpetuity,’ is treated as a ‘political’ 
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commitment rather than binding domestic law.”40  Due to the ‘Rule of Construction,’ in 
its present form the Deal is also subject to “the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954, the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 
2006, and other applicable U.S. law”41 Consequently, the transfer of nuclear material may 
not occur until the President has certified to Congress that the transfer would not be 
inconsistent with IAEA provisions nor would it be inconsistent with India’s Separation 
Plan.  Additionally, it requires termination of all nuclear trade should India detonate a 
nuclear device.  Further, the provisions of the Deal require India to allow IAEA 
inspectors access to existing and future civilian nuclear reactors, yet do not guarantee 
U.S. fuel supplies to support such reactors.  For this reason, “once the separation plan is 
implemented and some two-thirds of nuclear reactors are working on imported fuel, if 
fuel imports are terminated, the cost to the economy of testing becomes prohibitive.  
Under such conditions, India’s voluntary moratorium on testing becomes a de facto 
permanent ban.”42 
The provisions of the Hyde Act and H.R. 7081 also “direct the President to: (1) 
certify to the Committees that it is U.S. policy to work with members of the NSG to 
restrict transfers of equipment and technology related to the enrichment of uranium and 
reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel; and (2) seek to achieve within NSG or with NSG 
participating governments the adoption of principles and exchanges of information to 
assure peaceful use and accounting of by-product material.”43 While the NSG has 
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provided an exception for India, it is clear that the United States intends to advocate close 
oversight of India to ensure safe and responsible transfers of nuclear material. 
A Break from the Past 
During the 1950s, the United States promoted nuclear energy cooperation with 
India as part of the Atoms for Peace program.  This program was, in part, designed to 
distribute nuclear technology, materials, and information to countries with minimal 
research capabilities.  However, with the creation of the NPT in 1968, and India’s refusal 
to sign, the United States became wary of India’s nuclear developments.  When India 
exploded a “peaceful” nuclear device in 1974, the United States quickly recognized that 
what had been intended as a peaceful transfer of nuclear technology had the potential to 
contribute to the production of nuclear weapons.  This resulted in the United States 
cutting all nuclear cooperation efforts with India as well as creating the NSG in 1975—an 
organization devoted to reducing nuclear proliferation and improving safeguards on 
existing materials.  For this reason, the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal and especially the 
exception made for India by the NSG marked an entirely new U.S. position toward India 
as well as a new stance on nonproliferation.44 
U.S. Commitment to Getting the Deal Approved: Proponents of the Deal 
 
 Those in favor of the passage of the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal argued that a 
partnership with India is of utmost importance for several reasons. First, there is a need to 
unite the world’s two largest democracies to encourage democracy throughout the world.  
Second, a partnership is favorable for cooperation in fighting terrorism.  Third, the Deal 
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is necessary for geostrategic purposes because there is a need to prevent the domination 
of Asia by a single power, particularly China.  Proponents of the Deal also felt that denial 
of the Deal would mean losing India’s cooperation as a strategic partner, one that could 
be of help to the aforementioned goals of the United States.   
 Many in favor of the Deal also point to India’s responsible stewardship of its 
nuclear technology to date.  India has a history of imposing voluntary safeguards on its 
nuclear program as well as a history of nonproliferation.  Those in favor of the Deal 
believe that it would reward India for its responsible behavior with regard to its nuclear 
technology.  Although India is not a signatory of the NPT, it has never cooperated with 
other countries in selling or trading nuclear technology.  While some in India question the 
reasons for such strict controls on its nuclear capabilities, the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal 
would provide India with an incentive to continue its voluntary controls.  As President 
Bush pointed out, it is far better for the nonproliferation community if India is working 
with the U.S. instead of against it.45   
India and Indian-American Commitment to Obtaining Approval of the Deal 
 
While much of the leadership in the United States was committed to having the 
Deal approved by Congress, authorities in India also had a large stake in its approval.  
The privileged position granted to India through not only the Deal, but also the NSG 
exception, essentially elevates India’s status in Asia, making it a more credible 
counterpart to its regional rival, China.  While India is not recognized as a nuclear power 
under the NPT, the Deal fundamentally gives India de facto recognition as such a power.  
Additionally, the Deal would allow India access to additional nuclear energy sources that 
are of great importance to its civilian nuclear program.  India requires the ability to 
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import nuclear technology as well as obtain capital to sustain its nuclear energy needs 
while building its infrastructure and manufacturing base so that it can then independently 
provide for its nuclear needs.  India may also benefit from the Deal by receiving 
advanced technology previously developed by the U.S.   
Due to the Deal’s significant benefits for India, many politically involved Indian-
Americans felt that a strong lobbying effort in the United States was of utmost 
importance.  As substantial immigration really began a mere forty-five years ago, most 
Indian-Americans are either first or second generation residents, and for this reason many 
still feel very connected to their country of origin and want to see it advance in world 
stature.       
Opponents to the Deal: Why the Deal was NOT a Foregone Conclusion 
 
 Concerns among many nonproliferation advocates that the Deal was going too far 
resulted in a final version of H.R. 7081 that significantly pared down the initial intention 
for full nuclear cooperation.  The initial intentions of the Deal produced three major 
objections.  The first is the concern that the Deal creates a privileged position for India.  
The second is the break from traditional nonproliferation standards on which the United 
States prides itself.  The third deals with the implications for the NPT.  
 India, Pakistan and Israel are the three countries that are non-signatories of the 
NPT.  Allowing India access to nuclear technology while not requiring it to be a NPT 
signatory provides India with a privileged position because it receives many benefits of 
NPT signatories while not having to commit to any of the provisions of the Treaty.  
Additionally, the Deal puts India in an advantaged position over Pakistan and Israel.  This 
is especially of concern to Pakistan as it has been a strong United States ally for many 
years.  In fact, Pakistan asked for a similar nuclear cooperation agreement after the 2005 
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announcement of U.S.-India cooperation, but Pakistan’s request for such assistance was 
denied.  As President Bush stated, “Pakistan and India are different countries with 
different needs and different histories. As we proceed forward, our strategy will take in 
those well-known differences.”46 By elevating India to a new, privileged position, the 
United States may create a nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan, provoking 
Pakistan to become an even greater proliferation risk by turning to other countries, such 
as China, for additional nuclear capabilities.  The United States may be simply creating 
enemies in the Asian region, something that is dangerous for regional stability as well as 
for U.S. geostrategic concerns. 
The extremely controversial nature of the Deal is also exemplified by 
Washington’s nonproliferation community who remained opposed to a special exception 
for India to engage in nuclear commerce as a non-NPT signatory.  These nonproliferation 
advocates argued that:  
No matter how many facilities India places under safeguards, the opening of the 
international uranium market—forbidden to India since 1992 by the NSG—in 
effect frees up India’s domestic uranium for its nuclear weapons program, and 
therefore, would assist the Indian nuclear weapons program.  Consequently, only 
India’s halt in the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons would ensure 
that U.S. assistance does not aid India’s nuclear programs… for almost 30 years, 
the U.S. legal standard has been that only nuclear safeguards on all nuclear 
activities in a state provides adequate assurances.  The Administration is 
apparently asking Congress to back a lower level of assurance by proposing that 
the separation plan take the place of comprehensive safeguards.47 
 
Furthermore, while the Deal imparts incentives for India to continue its voluntary nuclear 
controls, it does not place any restrictions on the number of nuclear weapons India may 
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produce.  Most other major nuclear powers such as France, Britain, Russia and even the 
United States are working to limit the production of fissile material, yet the Deal does not 
employ such incentives for India.48  The Deal also requires India to place safeguards only 
on those facilities and materials produced following its implementation.  For this reason, 
India could potentially use previously produced fissile material for the production of 
nuclear weapons, while using any recently produced material for civilian nuclear 
purposes. “While India has pledged that any U.S. assistance to its civilian nuclear energy 
program will not benefit its nuclear weapons program, experts say India could use the 
imported nuclear fuel to feed its civilian energy program while diverting its own nuclear 
fuel to weapons production.  New Delhi has done similar things in the past; India claimed 
it was using nuclear technology for civilian purposes right up until its first nuclear 
weapons test in 1974.”49 Finally, those opposed to the Deal believe that making India an 
exception to the NPT only legitimizes the corrupt practices of other NPT signatories such 
as China which has been supplying Pakistan, a non-nuclear weapon state, with nuclear 
technology.50  
 The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal could also have far-reaching implications for the 
NPT itself.  Article I of the treaty states: “Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty 
undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or 
indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon 
State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
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devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.”51  As nuclear 
nonproliferation advocates have asserted, “a voluntary safeguards agreement like those of 
the other five nuclear weapon states would not meet the NPT Article I obligations…India 
must accept some kind of safeguards arrangement that would allow safeguards to endure 
in perpetuity.”52  Although India’s Separation Plan is intended to avoid any confusion 
between civilian and military nuclear programs, India’s ability to determine which of its 
facilities are civilian and which are military could potentially create a situation in which 
the United States is unknowingly undermining the NPT. 
While there are potential benefits for the United States in passing the U.S.-India 
Nuclear Deal, it seems that, from undermining traditional nonproliferation practices to 
creating possible regional instability in an already volatile region, there were still a large 
number of risks inherent in the passage of H.R. 7081.  For these reasons, much more than 
a presidential initiative was needed to secure passage of the Deal.  It is in this context that 
the Indian-American lobby came into prominence and was able not only to influence U.S. 
foreign policy, but also to consolidate its success as a legitimate lobby with the 
possibility of having wide-reaching influence in the future. 
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CHAPTER 2—Solidification of Influence: USINPAC in Focus 
 
I. HOW THE LOBBY WAS ABLE TO INFLUENCE THE U.S.-INDIA DEAL: WHY 
THE RECENT SUCCESS? 
 
 It was in the wake of the events of September 11th and the changing relationship 
between the U.S. and India that Indian-American mobilization began to accelerate.  
USIPNAC, the most influential Indian-American lobby, was founded in this context in 
2002.  However, it was not until the recent U.S.-India Nuclear Deal that this lobby was 
able to consolidate its influence.  This raises two questions: what lead to USINPAC’s 
most recent success and will this success continue in the future?   
Proposed Explanations for Ethnic Lobby Effectiveness 
 
 There are several proposed explanations for the success of ethnic lobbies.  The 
first is that the size of an ethnic group and/or the size of the ethnic lobby itself contributes 
to its ability to influence congressional policy.  It is argued that the larger the unified base 
of voters, the more effective the lobby.  The second explanation is that ethnic lobbies 
have greater success if they are “pushing on an open door,” meaning that the issues for 
which they are lobbying already have significant congressional support.  The third is that 
lobbies with no organized opposition to their cause have more success than those that 
have to fight an opposing lobby.  The last explanation is that the greater the 
organizational strength of a lobby, the more effective it will be.53   
 In the case of the Indian-American lobby, its most recent success was based on 
neither size, nor “push on an open door,” nor lack of an organized opposition.  Instead, 
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this case demonstrates that it was the organizational strength of the Indian-American 
lobby that lead to its successful effort in helping to pass the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal. 
Size?  
 
 It has often been suggested that the size of an ethnic lobby or the electoral turnout 
rate of the ethnic community is what enables ethnic groups to influence policy.  However, 
based on the lobbying success of relatively small ethnic groups, it is apparent this is not 
always the case.  For example, the Armenian-American lobby is much smaller than the 
Indian-American lobby, yet Armenian-Americans have had significant successes 
influencing U.S. policy.54  Furthermore, the Indian-American community is not a 
significant voting block; it is more of a donor block.  Unlike large ethnic groups such as 
Hispanics, Indian-Americans do not have the ability to influence policy by turning out 
their base.  They must instead rely on donating substantial amounts of money to 
congressmen in the hope they will be receptive to arguments made in favor of policies 
most important to the Indian-American community.  Based on the lobbying success of 
both smaller and larger ethnic groups, it is apparent that the size of the Indian-American 
lobby is not what drove its most recent success.  
“Push on an Open Door?” 
 
 As discussed above, there were several possible implications of the Deal that 
created a strong opposition.  The break from traditional nonproliferation practices, the 
alienation of Pakistan, the potential creation of regional instability and volatility, and the 
possible weakening of the NPT are among some of the most important factors that 
created this strong opposition to the Deal.  Congress was split on the pros and cons of the 
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Deal, and for this reason, the lobbying effort of USINPAC was not simply reinforcing an 
already likely conclusion.  It has been noted that:  
strategic ‘self-evidence’ does not account fully for the surprisingly high levels of 
congressional support for the nuclear agreement, especially given the deal’s 
historic break with the NPT and recently heightened proliferation concerns related 
to North Korea and Iran.  Not only did the agreement face strong principled 
opposition, but the Bush administration was rather clumsy in teeing it up…[for 
this reason] we must turn to the efforts of the Indian-American community, which 
has lately become much more politically active following a two-generation 
process of gradual organization.55  
 
Lack of an Organized Opposition? 
 
 Not only was there opposition to the Deal among members of Congress, but there 
were also several nonproliferation organizations that mounted strong lobbying efforts to 
inhibit passage of the legislation.  On August 15, 2008, just months before H.R. 7081 was 
passed, over 150 non-proliferation specialists and NGOs, from approximatley two-dozen 
countries, wrote a letter to the Foreign Ministers of the NSG.  The letter stated:  
India's commitments under the current terms of the proposed arrangement do not 
justify making far-reaching exceptions to international nonproliferation rules and 
norms.  Contrary to the claims of its advocates, the deal fails to bring India further 
into conformity with the nonproliferation behavior expected of the member states 
of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Unlike 178 other countries, India 
has not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). It continues to 
produce fissile material and expand its nuclear arsenal. As one of only three states 
never to have signed the NPT, it has not made a legally-binding commitment to 
achieve nuclear disarmament, and it refuses to allow comprehensive, full-scope 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.  Yet the arrangement 
would give India rights and privileges of civil nuclear trade that have been 
reserved only for members in good standing under the NPT. It creates a dangerous 
distinction between “good” proliferators and “bad” proliferators and sends out 
misleading signals to the international community with regard to NPT norms.56  
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The letter goes on to list potential dangers of supporting the Deal, which include: 
undermining the nuclear safeguards regime, possible transfer of sensitive enrichment and 
reprocessing items, indirect assistance to India’s nuclear weapons program, and 
facilitating Indian nuclear testing.  Undoubtedly, there was a large, well-organized 
opposition to USINPAC’s lobbying efforts.  It was not the case that the lack of an 
organized opposition contributed to the recent success of the Indian-American lobby.    
Organizational Strength? 
 
 If it is not the size of the lobby, the ability to “push on an open door,” or the lack 
of an organized opposition, then it follows that the organizational strength of the Indian-
American lobby is what most likely lead to its success in influencing the passage of the 
U.S.-India Nuclear Deal.  With further exploration, it becomes apparent that this is 
indeed the case. 
II. ORGANIZATIONAL STRENGTH: THE KEY TO THE SUCCESS OF USINPAC 
 
 While organizational strength has been previously cited as a potential explanation 
for the success of ethnic lobbies, what constitutes such strength must be analyzed.  This 
section will explain and define organizational strength, as well as demonstrate how 
USINPAC used such strength to influence the passage of the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal. 
Organizational Strength Model 
 
Organizational strength, for the purposes of this paper, will be defined as: 
 
1. The ability to attract members 
• From different regions in the United States 
• From different viewpoints (most importantly from both the Hindu and 
South Asian groups) 
• From different age groups 
2. The ability to build a strong economic profile by generating donations from 
members as well as those in the broader Indian-American community 
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These organizational factors lead to two additional benefits that permit lobbies to 
influence policy.  First, having members who are diverse in geographic, economic, and 
ideological background creates a national constituency which makes it easier to frame 
one’s message in a way that is most likely to influence Congress.  Second, with a large 
fundraising initiative and a strong economic profile, it becomes easier to channel major 
donations to congressmen while encouraging them to support policies most favorable to 
one’s agenda and concerns.   
Organizational Strength in Practice 
 
 While USINPAC had previous success in influencing a number of relatively 
minor U.S. policies, the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal marked a profound breakthrough in the 
ability of the lobby to influence high-level policy.  As a fairly new lobby, prior to 
influencing the Deal, USINPAC had been building up its organizational strength.  Its 
influence on the Deal then consolidated the lobby into a strong force that, with a solid 
organizational foundation, may have an easier time influencing policy in the future. 
 For USINPAC, the first tenet of the organizational strength model—the ability to 
attract members from different regions, viewpoints, and age groups—developed slowly 
as the lobby began to address the previously fragmented political organization of the 
Indian-American community.  First, USINPAC capitalized on the settling pattern of 
Indian-Americans that developed when they first immigrated to the United States 
following the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act.  As previously discussed, Indians 
settled in several major cities which fortuitously happened to be distributed throughout 
the United States.  From California to New York and from Texas to Illinois, those states 
in which Indians settled were also large, politically influential states.  This became 
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helpful as USINPAC could cite support from many regions of the country when lobbying 
Congress for passage of the Deal.   
Second, USINPAC reached out for support from all age groups.  The lobby 
understood the value of attracting young members so the organization could continue its 
success beyond the tenure of its founders.  USINPAC started a Youth Committee with a 
mission to “increase awareness among the Indian-American youth of issues concerning 
the Indian-American community and to actively engage the Indian-American youth in 
[the lobby] to impact policies on issues concerning the Indian-American community.”57  
USINPAC speaks of Indian-American youth as “the future of our community and the 
leaders of tomorrow.”58 It is clear that, in designing a program to target younger members 
of the Indian-American community, USINPAC has increased its organizational strength. 
Lastly and perhaps most significantly, USINPAC has worked to bridge the 
fragmented mobilization of the Hindu and South Asian identity groups.  USINPAC’s 
website details a grassroots program called the National Outreach Program which the 
lobby started.  This program “is an ambitious undertaking by USINPAC to coordinate the 
efforts of politically active Indian American organizations and individuals.”59  Founder 
Sanjay Puri believes that the program is essential to USINPAC’s efforts because “it is 
vital that we have a unified stand to impact issues facing the community.”60 By reaching 
out to Indian-Americans from many different viewpoints, USINPAC aims to consolidate 
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the Indian-American voice, magnifying its influence on Congress on those issues most 
important to the community.   
 By reaching out to Indian-Americans settled in various regions of the United 
States, creating a Youth Committee to perpetuate the new vision of Indian-American 
leadership, and starting a National Outreach Program to bridge the voices of different 
Indian-American viewpoints, USINPAC has created a strong foundation for its 
organizational strength.  This lobby has indeed succeeded in achieving the first part of the 
organizational model previously defined. 
  The second basic tenet of the organizational strength model is the ability to build 
a strong economic profile.  Due to the relative affluence of the Indian-American 
community, USINPAC has had considerably less difficulty than many other lobbies 
achieving this objective.  As of 2002, “Indian-Americans [were] one of the most affluent 
groups in the United States,”61 and they have used such affluence to their advantage when 
mobilizing politically.  “Over the last three election cycles, they have contributed an 
estimated $8 million to federal election campaigns.”62 USINPAC has worked to generate 
funds from members of its community by soliciting donations on its website as well as by 
exercising its networking effort.  Its website boasts a “get involved” section in which 
individuals can join, contribute, volunteer, or petition for the organization.  USINPAC 
has worked hard to develop the second facet of the organizational strength model. 
 Because USINPAC has both the ability to attract a diverse range of members and 
to create a large funding base to achieve its desired political activities, it also benefits 
from the two additional factors that arise from the basic organizational model.  First, with 
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regard to the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal, USINPAC was able to frame its message—the 
desired passage of the Deal—in a way most likely to obtain congressional ratification.  
For example, USINPAC linked the US-India Deal to other goals in U.S. policy related to 
India.  It framed the Deal in terms of economic and environmental goals as well as trade 
potential in the civilian nuclear sector.  By linking the Deal to policies that were 
favorable for the U.S., USINPAC made H.R. 7081 more appealing to Congress, 
highlighting additional benefits that would result from a strategic partnership with India.  
USINPAC also used its organizational strength to highlight the importance of the Deal by 
issuing briefs to members of Congress, holding receptions and fundraisers, and garnering 
the attention of the mainstream media. 
Second, due to its organizational strength, USINPAC has been able to channel 
major donations to congressmen to encourage them to support policies most favorable to 
its agenda and concerns.  USINPAC has used this strategy effectively by donating to 
congressmen in the regions that have the most concentrated Indian-American 
populations.  By making campaign contributions to congressmen in areas with significant 
Indian-American populations, USINPAC has been able to encourage those members of 
congress both to vote favorably on policies it supports and to enlist the support of other 
congressional delegations. Building reciprocal relationships with congressmen has been a 
crucial aspect in the organizational model of USINPAC.  The lobby also designed a 
tracking system that appeared on its website and was specifically geared toward the U.S.-
India Nuclear Deal.  It followed the progress of the Deal in Congress by tracking which 
congressmen were already in favor of the Deal and which needed to be targeted for 
further attention.   
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As part of this effort, the lobby wrote many letters to congressmen explaining 
why the Deal should be supported and urging them to act favorably.  The following 
serves as an example of one such letter:    
Open Letter to Members of Congress 
“On behalf of USINPAC, an organization which promotes issues that are shaped by the 
emerging concerns of two million Indian Americans living in the United States, I 
respectfully urge you to support the civil nuclear cooperation agreement between the US 
and India. This historic agreement has the potential to transform US-India relations and 
this is why USINPAC has taken the lead in ensuring that Congress knows that this issue 
is of utmost importance to the Indian American community.  
  
For the past eight months, USINPAC has been actively engaged in Washington and 
India. In advance of President Bush’s trip to India and in response to Prime Minister 
Singh’s visit to the US, USINPAC also hosted a critical event about the agreement which 
was attended by key Members of Congress and India’s Ambassador Ronen Sen. In 
January 2006, USINPAC took a delegation to India where we met with Government 
leaders to further this cause. 
 
While we are clearly aware that this agreement cannot move forward without 
Congressional approval, USINPAC is hopeful that you will consider the views of our 
community as you begin to deliberate this very serious matter. We are also hopeful that 
you will take into account India’s response to concerns raised by those who would 
oppose this agreement.  
  
To date, India has produced a plan to separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities 
much sooner than originally planned. India has committed to more than triple the number 
of nuclear reactors under IAEA safeguards. India will allow more detailed inspections by 
the IAEA as evidenced by agreeing to the Additional Protocol. India has also created a 
new Export Control System to further protect its nuclear technology and materials from 
proliferation. While India already has a stellar record of nonproliferation, it is evident by 
the actions India has agreed to take that global nonproliferation will be enhanced should 
the US Congress decide to support civil nuclear cooperation. In fact, if supported by the 
US Congress, the agreement reached by Prime Minister Singh and President Bush will 
bring India’s nuclear program into the international mainstream.  
  
As importantly, civil nuclear cooperation will help India address its rapidly rising energy 
needs which will increase more than threefold over the next thirty years. By lessening 
India’s demand for other energy supplies, the price of fossil fuels for consumers in 
America and around the world also will be curbed.  
  
Finally, India, with a population of more than one billion, is a key U.S. ally in, as The 
Economist labels it, “one of the world’s tougher neighbourhoods.” India is also 
positioned to become the world’s third largest economy. Civil nuclear cooperation as 
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proposed by President Bush and Prime Minister Singh will bolster security and stability 
which is good for America, good for India, and good for you.  
 
Again, USINPAC respectfully urges you to support civilian nuclear cooperation between 
the United States and India. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact us at 
202-861-1900 or mantani@usinpac.com.” Sincerely, Sanjay Puri. March 14, 2006. 63 
 
Letters such as this demonstrate the direct effort USINPAC made to facilitate passage of 
the Deal in Congress. 
In addition, in an effort to make certain that congressmen were not conflicted by 
differing policies between the United States and India, USINPAC lead a fact finding 
mission to India in 2007.  Just as the Deal was not a foregone conclusion in the U.S., 
there were several groups opposed to the Deal in India, as well.  While the Congress 
Party was in favor, the BJP had concerns that the independence of India’s foreign policy 
would be sacrificed, and the Communist Party of India (CPI) argued that the Deal would 
create a situation in which India was yielding to “arm-twisting by the US.”64 For this 
reason, during a period of stalled activity in India, USINPAC met with senior leaders of 
the Congress Party, the Left Parties, and the BJP Party with the “sole intention of 
understanding differing perspectives, so that [they] could come back and report to 
constituencies in the community and on the Hill…”65 USINPAC met with Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh of the Congress Party, President of the BJP, Rajnath Singh, and 
National Secretary of the CPI, D. Raja.  All parties recognized USINPAC as “an 
organization that is working in an unbiased fashion.”66 Furthermore, it has been noted 
that both “the Indian media and Indian public seem to trust USINPAC as an advocate and 
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facilitator of US-India ties.”67 The fact that USINPAC has been able to hold discussions 
with both congressmen in the United States as well as high ranking officials from all of 
the most prominent political parties in India again demonstrates this lobby’s 
organizational strength.  Being a trusted organization in India gives USINPAC the ability 
to leverage support in India for those policies it wishes to advance in the United States.  
By developing solid working relationships with officials in both the United States and 
India, this lobby has created the ability to influence U.S. foreign policy by not only 
holding discussions with high officials in the U.S., but also by working to facilitate 
agreement between officials in the U.S. and India. 
While it has been suggested that the success of ethnic lobbies may be due in part 
to size, “push on an open door,” or lack of an organized opposition, these possibilities do 
not explain the reason for the recent success of USINPAC in influencing the U.S.-India 
Nuclear Deal.  Instead, USINPAC’s strong organizational strength seems to be the 
driving factor behind its success.  This lobby meets the requirements of the outlined 
organizational strength model and further reaps its predicted benefits by garnering 
significant membership and funds.   
III. ANALYZING USINPAC’s SUCCESS 
 
 While it is clear that USINPAC employed its organizational strength in an attempt 
to influence the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal, it remains necessary to determine what, if any, 
success USINPAC had in building congressional support for the Deal.  But what is a 
success in this context?  
A success will be defined as having a recognized impact on influencing the 
passage of the Deal.  Because there were many other influences working to push the Deal 
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through Congress, it is difficult to tease out the extent to which each of these competing 
factors influenced the result.  Consequently, the way to determine the success of 
USINPAC is to show that: (1) the lobby was actively working to influence members of 
Congress; (2) members of Congress recognized USINPAC as a significant player in 
obtaining ratification of the Deal; and (3) a relatively high correlation existed between 
those congressmen who voted in favor of the Deal and those congressmen to whom 
USINPAC made campaign contributions.  As previously shown, USINPAC worked hard 
to actively influence congressmen—the first requirement for a success.  The following 
sections will discuss the reflections congressmen had regarding USINPAC’s active work 
as well as provide a model to show the correlation between congressmen voting in favor 
of the Deal and donations USINPAC gave to these congressmen. 
Congressmen Define the Success of USINPAC 
 
While it is clear that USINPAC actively worked to ensure the passage of the U.S.-
India Deal, in order to determine if it met the second factor in the analysis of success, it is 
necessary to look at the reactions of congressmen to USINPAC’s efforts.   
Congressman Eni Faleomavaega (D-AS), a ranking member of the House 
International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific and Co-Chair of the 
Congressional Task Force on US-India Investment and Trade Relations said “USINPAC 
has been actively working to advance the proposal for full nuclear cooperation between 
the US and India.”68  He added: 
Having served on the International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the 
Pacific for almost twenty years, I commend USINPAC for its efforts. No other 
organization has worked harder or been more effective in giving a voice to India 
and Indian Americans and, in these historical times, USINPAC is to be applauded 
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for the work it is doing to strengthen US-India relations and shore up support for 
the civic nuclear cooperation agreement…The passage of this crucial legislation is 
a testament to USINPAC’s determination to work closely with senior 
administration officials and key Members of Congress to bring to fruition the 
legislative goals of the Indian American community.69  
 
Congressman Joe Crowly (D-NY), a Member of the House Committee on 
International Relations and former Co-Chair of the House Caucus on India and Indian 
Americans commented that “Given the importance of this agreement, I commend 
USINPAC for mobilizing the Indian American community and for tirelessly working to 
make sure your voice is heard.”70 Additionally, once the Deal had gained substantial 
support in Congress, U.S. Representative Illeana Ros-Lehtinen stated: 
Although the initiative has strong bipartisan support in the House and the Senate, 
there are increasing concerns that there may be too little time left in this session 
for Congress to act. I look forward to working closely with Indian-American 
organizations such as USINPAC that have been proactive in educating us about 
the importance of an expeditious approval of the deal by Congress.71   
 
These comments laud USINPAC’s continued hard work for passage of the Deal, 
especially when it appeared to be stalled.  Congressman Frank Pallone (D-NJ) discussed 
his desire to continue to work with the USINPAC in the future: “I am proud of the strong 
support this agreement received.” He added, “I congratulate USINPAC today and look 
forward to continuing to work closely in the future to address the concerns of the 
community.”72 Finally, Senator Kit Bond (R-MO) summed up the efforts of USINPAC 
by stating:  
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I want to commend the Senate for passing this historic agreement and I especially 
applaud the efforts of key members of the House and the Senate who have worked 
hand in hand with Secretary of State Nicholas Burns and in cooperation with 
USIBA/USINPAC to keep this deal alive. Tonight’s vote is a culmination of those 
efforts which will re-define US-India relations for generations to come and 
USINPAC/USIBA should be recognized for the significant work they have done 
to bring this agreement about.73  
 
These statements demonstrate that members of Congress who are heavily 
involved in Indian affairs recognized USINPAC as a substantial player in helping to 
obtain passage of the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal.   
Donations Cross-Listed with Voting Record  
 
Yet another way to define the success of USINPAC is to look at the donations 
given by this lobby to members of Congress in the 2006 and 2008 election cycles, and 
cross-reference these donations with the roll call votes from H.R. 7081.* From this 
information, the percentage of representatives and senators who were given campaign 
contributions and subsequently voted for the bill can then be determined.  A high 
correlation between the number of congressmen to whose campaigns USINPAC donated 
and those who voted for the Deal will indicate a high level of success for USINPAC in 
influencing congressmen (See Chart 1).  
 When looking at those members of Congress who voted for H.R. 7081 in 
conjunction with the donations made to them by USINPAC in 2006, it is apparent that 
USINPAC did indeed obtain a large number of votes from those congressmen to whom it 
donated.  While some donations were given to congressmen who may have been already 
favored the Deal, USINPAC channeled other donations to members of Congress 
representing states with large percentages of Indian-Americans or those members who 
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held prominent positions on committees or caucuses most important to the community 
(i.e. the India Caucus, U.S. Committee on Foreign Affairs, etc.).  USINPAC gave 
donations in an attempt to influence the vote on H.R. 7081, while simultaneously 
continuing to build reciprocal relationships with those congressmen receptive to the 
interests most important to USINPAC.   
It is important to look at the 2006 voting cycle donations because these were the 
last donations given to congressmen prior to their 2008 vote on H.R. 7081.  In the House, 
USINPAC made donations to 41 candidates.  Nine of these were not elected, not re-
elected, or not eligible to vote, and for this reason did not vote on the bill.  Of those who 
voted, twenty-five voted in favor of the Deal, four voted against the Deal, and one 
abstained from voting.  Thus, 81% of those representatives who could vote and to whom 
USINPAC donated voted for the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal.  Additionally, all but one of 
those voting against the bill were representatives from areas that do not have a large 
percentage of Indian-Americans.  The only exception was Representative Diane E. 
Watson from California, a state having a large number of Indian-Americans.  In the 
Senate, USINPAC donated to nine individuals.  Of these nine, eight voted in favor of the 
Bill and one senator abstained.  There were no senators to whom USINPAC donated that 
voted against H.R. 7081.  With an overwhelming majority of those to whom USINPAC 
donated voting for the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
lobby’s donations favorably impacted those congressmen USINPAC intended to 
influence.  
While the 2008 voting cycle occurred shortly after the vote on H.R. 7081, it is still 
important to look at USINPAC’s donations during this period as they may indicate which 
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congressmen the lobby rewarded for their support of the Deal.  Such support would 
suggest a continuing reciprocal relationship.  In the House, USINPAC made donations to 
22 representatives.  Two of these congressmen were either not re-elected or were not able 
to vote.  Of those who voted, eighteen voted in favor of the Deal, two voted against the 
Deal, and one abstained from voting.  Thus, approximately 91% of those representatives 
who could vote and to whom USINPAC donated voted for the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal.  
Additionally, during this cycle, the two representatives voting against the bill were both 
from areas that do not have a large percentage of Indian-Americans.  In the Senate, 
USINPAC donated to nine individuals.  Of these nine, four were either not elected or not 
re-elected, and the remaining five voted in favor of the bill.  It is clear that even after the 
vote on H.R. 7081, USINPAC continues to reward those members of Congress who 
support the lobby’s agenda and thus aims to perpetuate the reciprocal relationships 
necessary for future success of the lobby. 
 By reviewing USINPAC’s lobbying efforts, the congressional recognition of 
those efforts as a driving force behind passage of the Deal, and the way donations to 
congressmen correlate with their voting behavior, it is reasonable to conclude that due to 
its organizational strength, USINPAC has indeed had success in influencing the passage 
of the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal.   
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Chapter 3—Helping Hands: Influences on USINPAC and the U.S. 
India Nuclear Deal 
 
I. A MODEL FOR ORGNIAZATIONAL STRENGTH: JEWISH AMERICANS, 
AIPAC and AJC 
 
 The organizational model developed by USINPAC is not unique to this 
organization.  Instead, it has been argued that this model stemmed from the examples of 
powerful Jewish lobbies in the United States.  The Jewish-American community in the 
United States operates two of the most powerful lobbies in the country—the American-
Israel Political Action Committee (AIPAC) and the American-Jewish Committee (AJC).  
For years, these lobbies have had tremendous success in lobbying Congress on issues 
important to the Jewish-American community.  However, it is not only the success of the 
Israel lobby that influenced Indian-Americans to adopt this lobby’s organizational model, 
but it is the commonalities between Indian-Americans and Jewish-Americans that 
contribute to the desire of Indian-Americans to use the Jewish lobbies as a model for the 
development of their own highly-influential lobby.   
Commonalities between Indian-Americans and Jewish-Americans 
 
 First, both Jewish-Americans and Indian-Americans make up a relatively small 
percentage of the population in the United States.  According to the U.S. Census Bureau 
(2007), there are approximately 6.4 million Jews74 and 2.7 million Indians in the U.S. 75  
Jews make up only about 2.2% of the population in the United States and Indians about 
0.9% of the total population.  Indian-Americans noted that Jewish-Americans have been 
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able to make a profound influence on U.S. foreign policy despite their relatively small 
numbers.   
 Second, both Indian-Americans and Jewish-Americans are relatively affluent and 
have attained high levels of education.  Both of these factors contribute to their ability to 
influence Congress; large contributions to a lobby provide it with the funds necessary to 
donate to congressmen and in turn form reciprocal relationships.  Highly educated 
individuals also more easily navigate through the political system.   
 Third, India and Israel are both democratic countries and therefore, their 
respective lobbies are advantaged in Congress which respects democratic institutions and 
countries which have them.  This provides some leverage and a helpful subtext for both 
the Indian-American and Jewish lobbies.  At a minimum, because India is a democracy, 
USINPAC is not relegated to less legitimate consideration than the Jewish lobbies.   
 Lastly, it has been argued that the Israel lobby is effective, in part, because of the 
“special” relationship between the Untied States and Israel.  However, while Israel has a 
special relationship with the United States that many argue is unlike that of any other 
country, India and the United States seem to be developing a unique relationship as well.  
This relationship has yet to be solidified for the long-term, but the changing relationship 
outlined previously suggests that Indian-Americans may, in the future, find it less 
difficult to influence Congress just as Jewish-Americans have.  While the difference in 
relationships between the United States and Israel and the United States and India may 
have been a limiting factor in considering the Jewish lobby as a model, the newly 
developed strategic partnership between the United States and India further demonstrates 
that USINPAC’s decision to use the Jewish lobby as a role model was prudent. 
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The Basis for a Model: How AIPAC* Achieves its Success 
 
 The effectiveness of the Jewish lobby in the United States is undisputed.  In both 
a 1997 Fortune magazine poll and a 2005 National Journal study, AIPAC was ranked as 
the second most powerful lobby in Washington.76* It is argued that this lobby has been so 
effective for two basic reasons, both of which are attributed to its organizational strength.  
First is its ability to influence Congress.  “Whatever an individual lawmaker or 
policymaker’s own views may be, the Lobby tries to make supporting Israel the ‘smart’ 
choice.”77  Second is its aptitude for ensuring that public discourse portrays Israel in a 
positive light.  “The goal is to prevent critical comments from getting a fair hearing in the 
political arena.  Controlling the debate is essential to guaranteeing US support.”78  
 AIPAC uses pro-Israel congressional staffers and targeted donations to influence 
Congress.  Those members of Congress who have a favorable view of Israel help this 
lobby to spread its message while simultaneously silencing those who may have a 
negative view of the country.  Additionally, by making large donations to those 
supporting AIPAC’s objectives and channeling funds to the political opponents of those 
seen as hostile toward Israel, AIPAC aims to control the voting outcome in Congress on 
issues affecting Israel.   
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By conducting letter writing campaigns and training young advocates, AIPAC 
tries to control what is said about Israel.  “The lobby doesn’t want an open debate,”79 and 
therefore aims to shut down any voices running counter to its objectives.  Letter writing 
campaigns strive to inundate congressmen with a constant flow of information so that 
they have no choice but to think one way about a targeted idea.  Similarly, AIPAC 
“monitors university activities and trains young advocates in order to vastly expand the 
number of students involved in campuses in the national pro-Israel effort.”80 This ensures 
that negative views of Israel are crushed before they even come to fruition.  AIPAC also 
aims to ensure that criticism of policies favorable toward Israel is cut off by leveraging 
influence over the executive branch, ensuring that critics of Israel do not get important 
foreign policy jobs, and monitoring what professors write and teach.81             
 Due to the incredibly effective organizational model developed by AIPAC, many 
members of USINPAC are blunt about their desire to emulate Jewish-American groups 
and have stated that they are interested in establishing a long-term relationship.82 
Although USINPAC has not yet developed such far-reaching influence that it has 
leverage over the executive branch, as discussed previously, when aiming to influence 
Congress, it has employed many of the same tactics as AIPAC.  From donations to 
targeted congressmen to letter writing campaigns to the creation of a Youth Committee 
and the use of pro-Indian congressional staffers in the House and Senate India caucuses, 
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USINPAC emulated many of AIPAC’s organizational tactics when aiming to influence 
H.R. 7081. 
Working Together 
 
 Not only did USINPAC use the Jewish lobbies as a model for its organization, but 
the Jewish lobbies have contributed to the success of USINPAC by building an 
increasingly friendly relationship with this lobby.  There are several examples of AIPAC 
and AJC have working with USINPAC to help it develop into an effective lobby.  On 
July 16, 2003, AIPAC, AJC, and USINPAC held the first-ever joint Capitol Hill forum 
for U.S. lawmakers.  Joe Wilson, Co-Chair of the Congressional India Caucus stated 
during the forum that it was “appropriate to make this bond.”83 Furthermore, it has been 
suggested that the AJC helped to establish the Congressional India Caucus, now the 
largest country caucus on Capitol Hill.84 AJC also sent letters to members of Congress 
urging them to support the U.S.-India Deal.  These letters targeted the Chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Richard Lugar, its Ranking Democrat Joseph 
Biden, Chair of the House International Relations Committee Henry Hyde, and Ranking 
Democrat Tom Lantos when stating that “the AJC strongly supports the proposed US-
India civil nuclear energy agreement and urges approval of the enabling legislation…the 
US-India nuclear agreement will advance the growing relationship [between India and 
the US]…The benefit of the nuclear energy deal is ‘strategic’ and in America’s best 
interest.”85 Additionally, an article in the newspaper India Abroad cited the AJC as 
having said: “the proposed agreement [the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal] is a pragmatic and 
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forward-looking response to the strategic requirements of both nations and one that 
recognized the nuclear capabilities of India, a vibrant democracy, while preserving the 
essence of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is a bulwark of peace and 
stability in the post-War world.”86  
 USINPAC’s organizational strength model, which has lead to its most recent 
success in influencing the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal, was modeled after the powerful 
Jewish-American lobbies, AIPAC and AJC.  These lobbies have helped USINPAC to 
develop and may have helped push the Deal through Congress, as well.  While Jewish-
American lobbies may have contributed to influencing Congress on the Deal, several 
other organizations may also have been instrumental.   
II. OTHER INFLUENCES 
 
As discussed previously, perhaps the largest influence supporting passage of the 
U.S.-India Nuclear Deal was the presidential initiative that began with a warming of 
relations between the U.S. and India during the Clinton era and continued into the Bush 
presidency, culminating in the passage of H.R. 7081 on October 8, 2008.  
Despite the presidential initiative, due to the controversial nature of the 
partnership, the passage of the Deal was not a foregone conclusion.  As previously 
discussed, USINPAC played a part in influencing the Deal’s ratification.  However, 
USINPAC’s lobbying effort was not the sole factor pushing the Deal through Congress; 
there were many different influential factors.  As Jason A. Kirk states, “it would be a 
gross oversimplification to suggest that congressional support for the U.S.-India nuclear 
agreement owes only to Indian-American efforts.”87  Therefore, to place in context the 
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influence that USINPAC had on the Deal, other factors that may have impacted its 
passage are examined.   
The Legislative Initiative: The India Caucus 
 
The House’s India Caucus was first formed in 1994 and today is the largest 
country caucus in Congress, making it exceedingly influential.88 The Caucus emerged as 
the result of discussions between the Indian American Forum for Political Education 
(IAFPE) and a group of congressmen lead by Frank Pallone (D-N.J.).  IAFPE was 
concerned at the way the U.S. State Department was portraying India, as this was a time 
when the State Department was particularly critical of India’s human rights policies in 
Kashmir.  As a consequence, the Caucus was formed for the purpose of educating 
Congress on issues concerning India.89  
A Senate “Friends of India” group was subsequently formed in April 2004.  
Senator John Cornyn (R-Tex) initiated the formation of the caucus and Senator Hillary 
Clinton (D-N.Y) became its Co-Chair.  This caucus was the first country-focused caucus 
in the Senate, making it a landmark for Indian-Americans.  The importance of the caucus 
was evident as then Majority Leader, Bill Frist (R-Tenn.) and Minority Leader, Tom 
Daschle (D-S.D.) were among the 20 initial members of the caucus.90 
While the exact extent to which these caucuses helped to push the Deal through 
Congress is unknown, it is clear from various press releases that they indeed contributed, 
in part, to the passage of the final legislation.  In an article from February 4th, 2008 in 
India Abroad titled: “India matters more than ever,” Co-Chair of the Senate India 
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Caucus, Senator Hillary Clinton emphasized the importance of voting for the US-India 
Nuclear Deal.91  Similarly, U.S. Representative and former Democratic Co-Chair of the 
House’s India Caucus, Gary Ackerman (D-NY), met with President Bush several times to 
discuss passage of the Deal and in an enthusiastic speech to Congress proclaimed, “it is 
time for a 21st Century policy towards India, one that supports and encourages India’s 
emergence as a responsible global power and solidifies the U.S.-India bilateral 
relationship for decades to come. The bill before us today is that new policy. Vote yes on 
H.R. 7081!”92  These powerful members of Congress who had formed the House and 
Senate India Caucuses continued to encourage Congress to pass those initiatives they 
believed best served the interests of the United States as well as India.  They clearly 
played a part in pushing the Deal through Congress.  
The Business Initiative: Indian and American Business Interests  
 
There were two types of business interests that impacted passage of the bill.  First, 
two Indian-American business groups—US-India Business Alliance and US-India 
Business Council were invested in the Deal’s passage.  Second, there were several 
businesses in the United States that had an interest in the Deal due to the increased 
trading potential for these businesses.   
The US-India Business Alliance (USIBA) was founded by President Sanjay Puri, 
the same individual who founded USINPAC.  This organization was established with the 
intention of “serving as an interface between Governments and businesses in the US and 
India and representing the concerns and issues of the US India trade community to 
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decision makers in the US and in India, as well as supporting legislation, policies, and 
programs, in Washington and in New Delhi to ensure rapid growth of investment and 
trade between US and India.”93 Due to the benefits of increased trade potential built into 
the Deal, this lobby also pressed Congress to pass the bill.  For example, on September 
11, 2008, USIBA held a briefing entitled “The US-India Nuclear Deal: Current 
Situation,” which was intended to educate those members of Congress who were still 
ambivalent toward the Deal.94  
The US-India Business Council (USIBC) operates with motives similar to USIBA 
with regard to the Deal.  This group is run by Chairman Indra K. Nooyi (Chairman and 
CEO of PepsiCo) with the mission of “representing America’s top companies investing in 
India, joined by global Indian companies, promoting economic reforms with an aim to 
deepen trade and strengthen commercial ties.”95 This organization creates a list of 
objectives each year.  One of its primary objectives for 2008 was to “enable U.S.-India 
cooperation in civilian nuclear power to become a reality by advocating for U.S. 
legislative approval of the 123 Agreement [and subsequently the U.S.-India Nuclear 
Deal]...”96 
Many businesses in the United States also had a vested interest in seeing the Deal 
pass because of lucrative trade opportunities which the Deal would foster due to warmer 
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relations between the U.S. and India.  For example, Boeing has projected a market of 
over $15 billion for its products in India over the next ten to fifteen years.97 Similarly, 
Lockheed Martin has bid to sell fighter planes to India’s air force.  Westinghouse Electric 
Co., leader in the US civilian nuclear industry is also lining up to build power plants for 
the ever-growing India whose electricity is expected to double by 2015.98  These 
companies represent just a few examples of the way businesses in the United States stand 
to benefit from the Deal.  Consequently, many of these companies likely worked to 
influence passage of the Deal as the benefits they would obtain were significant.     
The Indian Initiative: Lobbies Hired by India in the U.S. 
 
In addition to Indian-American lobby groups in the United States, the 
Government of India (GOI) also hired a consulting firm to represent its interests in 
congressional passage of the bill.  This firm, Barbour Griffith & Rogers (BGR Group), 
headed by Robert Blackwill, a former U.S. ambassador to India, has a diverse client base, 
from Fortune 500 companies to foreign governments and provides a variety of services, 
one of which is lobbying.  It is probable that these lobbying efforts, on which India spent 
nearly $1.3 million, impacted Congress’ passage of the Deal.99  
While USINPAC did indeed have an influence, it was by no means the sole group 
involved in pushing the Deal through Congress.  What is important, however, is to 
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understand how and to what extent USINPAC influenced passage of H.R. 7081 and if 
such significant influence can be replicated in the future.  
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Conclusions: USINPAC and Beyond 
 
After concluding that its organizational strength is the primary reason for 
USINPAC’s recent success, the question remains: will this success last, enabling the 
lobby to influence a wide-range of policies in the future, or was this a one-shot victory? 
Had USINPAC reached its goal due to the lack of an organized opposition or by 
“pushing on an open door,” it would be more likely that its recent success would not 
create a foundation for future success.  The “push on an open door” scenario would 
indicate that the success had been primarily driven by a presidential or congressional 
initiative.  However, as previously discussed, that is not the case.  Similarly, had 
USINPAC been successful due to the lack of an organized opposition, it is likely that if 
significant opposition materialized in the future, the lobby’s efforts would be 
undermined.  However, in the case of the Deal, there was indeed an organized opposition.  
USINPAC was able to skillfully parry such opposition and exert a positive impact.  
Therefore, it is likely that this lobby is organized to confront opposition in the future.  
Also, USINPAC was able to be successful as a relatively small lobby, so an increase in 
the number of members and resources could only help this lobby to succeed in 
influencing policy.   
The reciprocal relationships established with congressmen are likely to continue 
or even strengthen in the future as USINPAC continues to increase its campaign 
contributions and becomes more politically sophisticated.  The grassroots efforts 
USINPAC established are also likely to help extend the success of the lobby.  Having 
made great progress in bridging the gap between the formerly fractured voices of the 
Hindu and South Asian groups, it is probable that the lobby will be able to leverage these 
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newly united voices to influence policy in the future.  It may be argued that this Deal 
could have been favorably received by both Hindu and South Asian groups, and its 
passage may not have required USINPAC’s intervention to bridge the gap between the 
fractured Indian-American voices.  Had this been the case, influence on the Deal may 
have been issue-specific.  However, as discussed previously, the BJP was initially 
vehemently against the Deal, and the Hindu groups in the U.S. who identify with the BJP 
followed its lead; it was not a foregone conclusion that Hindu groups would support the 
Deal.  Consequently, the fact that USINPAC could eventually bridge these groups was 
indeed significant, suggesting a level of sophistication that bodes well for continued 
success.  
Future Implications: Beyond USINPAC 
 
The implications of USINPAC’s organizational model and success are three-fold.  
First, if USINPAC’s success in influencing policy is not issue specific but rather due to 
its organizational model, this strongly suggests USINPAC will have the ability to 
influence U.S. policy on a wide range of issues important to it in the future.  Second, 
USINPAC’s organizational model has implications for other ethnic lobbies.  Due to the 
enormous successes of the Jewish lobby and the recent achievements of the Indian-
American lobby, which has candidly adopted the organizational structure of the Jewish 
lobby, it is probable that other ethnic lobbies, to the extent possible, will adopt a similar 
organizational model.  Finally, USINPAC’s recent lobbying efforts have implications for 
the future of U.S. foreign policy.  Since the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, ethnic 
populations in the U.S. have risen rapidly.  It has taken time for these ethnic populations 
to settle into the U.S., and only now are they expressing a desire to make their voices 
heard.  Just as the Indian-American lobby has recently bolstered its organizational 
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strength to consolidate its voice in the public arena, as other ethnic groups organize to 
push their agendas, U.S. foreign policy may be increasingly shaped by ethnic minorities 
through their concentrated, well-funded, and aggressive lobbies. 
Final Remarks 
USINPAC has built a foundation which indicates that it is likely to have success 
in influencing U.S. congressional policy in the future.  However, such success in 
influencing congressional policy is dependent on a partnership with a willing 
administration that views favorably a continued warming of the U.S.-India relationship.  
The recent election of President Barack Obama leaves some uncertainty as to this 
administration’s relationship with India and thus the future of USINPAC’s effectiveness.  
While President Bush was exceedingly enthusiastic about developing a partnership with 
India, President Obama may be less committed to such a policy.  As the India Times 
recently stated, “[while] former US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice was on record 
that the US was committed to building up India as an influential global player…the 
Obama administration has virtually put on the backburner the US-India civil nuclear 
cooperation agreement of October 2008. It has yet to work on its global nuclear non-
proliferation and disarmament agenda and to determine where the agreement with India 
fits in with any new global architecture.”100  
Although the decisions of President Obama regarding the future of the Deal may 
not be the only factor determining the future of the relationship between India and the 
United States, it is likely that without a presidential commitment to making the Deal 
work, USINPAC will have a hard time influencing large-scale policy initiatives.  Due to 
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the ambiguities inherent in H.R. 7081, it will be up to the Obama Administration to 
follow through on the commitments of the Deal and thus continue the warming 
relationship between India and the United States.   
USINPAC has done its part in ensuring that it has the capability to influence 
Congress on a wide range of U.S. policies in the future.  Now, what lies ahead for this 
lobby will be, in large part, contingent upon future administrations’ decisions about how 
they will treat the U.S.-India partnership. 
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Chart 1 
Voting Cycle 2006: 
 
HOUSE 
Total to Democrats: $51,200 
Total to Republicans: $58,549 
Congressman Donation 
from 
USINPAC 
Vote on 
H.R. 
7081 
Akin, Todd (R-MO) $1,000 Aye 
Bass, Charles (R-NH) $500 N/A 
Berman, Howard L (D-CA) $1,000 Aye 
Bhakta, Raj Peter (R-PA) $1,000 N/A 
Bilirakis, Gus (R-FL) $1,000 Aye 
Blumenauer, Earl (D-OR) $2,000 No 
Cannon, Chris (R-UT) $3,500 Aye 
Clemons, Bret Michael (D-NH) $500 N/A 
Coble, Howard (R-NC) $1,000 Aye 
Crowley, Joseph (D-NY) $500 Aye 
Davis, Tom (R-VA) $1,000 Aye 
DeLay, Tom (R-TX) $500 N/A 
Doolittle, John T (R-CA) $1,049 Abstain 
Engel, Eliot L (D-NY) $1,000 Aye 
Etheridge, Bob (D-NC) $2,900 Aye 
Faleomavaega, Eni F H (D-AS) $5,000 N/A 
Fitzpatrick, Michael G (R-PA) $2,000 N/A 
Hall, Ralph M (R-TX) $2,000 Aye 
Hoekstra, Peter (R-MI) $1,000 Aye 
Honda, Mike (D-CA) $2,000 Aye 
Hoyer, Steny H (D-MD) $1,000 Aye 
Israel, Steve (D-NY) $2,000 Aye 
Issa, Darrell (R-CA) $1,000 Aye 
Jindal, Bobby (R-LA) $4,000 N/A 
Kellam, Phil (D-VA) $500 N/A 
Lantos, Tom (D-CA) $4,500 N/A 
Manzullo, Don (R-IL) $11,000 Aye 
McDermott, Jim (D-WA) $6,000 No 
Miller, Brad (D-NC) $2,900 Aye 
Moran, Jim (D-VA) $5,000 Aye 
Oberstar, James L (D-MN) $1,000 No 
Pallone, Frank Jr (D-NJ) $2,500 Aye 
Pence, Mike (R-IN) $6,500 Aye 
Price, David (D-NC) $2,900 Aye 
Reichert, Dave (R-WA) $2,000 Aye 
Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana (R-FL) $10,000 Aye 
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Royce, Ed (R-CA) $1,000 Aye 
Sessions, Pete (R-TX) $1,000 Aye 
Sodrel, Michael E (R-IN) $2,000 N/A 
Watson, Diane E (D-CA) $2,500 No 
Wexler, Robert (D-FL) $1,000 Aye 
 
SENATE 
Total to Democrats: $3,650 
Total to Republicans: $9,100 
Senator Donation 
from 
USINPAC 
Vote on 
H.R. 
7081 
Alexander, Lamar (R-TN) $1,100 Aye 
Bayh, Evan (D-IN) $2,100 Aye 
Cardin, Ben (D-MD) $500 Aye 
Cornyn, John (R-TX) $2,000 Aye 
Graham, Lindsey (R-SC) $1,000 Aye 
Kennedy, Edward M (D-MA) $1,000 Abstain 
Kyl, Jon (R-AZ) $1,000 Aye 
Landrieu, Mary L (D-LA) $50 Aye 
Lugar, Richard G (R-IN) $4,000 Aye 
 
 
Voting Cycle 2008: 
 
HOUSE 
Total to Democrats: $49,800 
Total to Republicans: 7,000 
Congressman Donation 
from 
USINPAC 
Vote on 
H.R. 
7081 
Akin, Todd (R-MO) $1,000 Aye 
Berman, Howard L (D-CA) $1,000 Aye 
Bilirakis, Gus (R-FL) $1,000 Aye 
Blumenauer, Earl (D-OR) $1,000 No 
Connolly, Gerry (D-VA) $2,500 Aye 
Crowley, Joseph (D-NY) $7,500 Aye 
Etheridge, Bob (D-NC) $4,400 Aye 
Faleomavaega, Eni F H (D-AS) $2,500 N/A 
Hodes, Paul W (D-NH) $3,000 Aye 
Honda, Mike (D-CA) $2,000 Aye 
Israel, Steve (D-NY) $2,000 Aye 
Madia, Ashwin (D-MN) $9,500 Aye 
McDermott, Jim (D-WA) $1,000 No 
Miller, Brad (D-NC) $4,400 Aye 
 60 
Moran, Jim (D-VA) $1,000 Aye 
Pallone, Frank Jr (D-NJ) $9,000 Aye 
Pence, Mike (R-IN) $2,500 Aye 
Price, David (D-NC) $1,000 Aye 
Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana (R-FL) $3,500 Aye 
Shuler, Heath (D-NC) $1,000 No 
Wexler, Robert (D-FL) $1,000 Abstain 
Wilson, Joe (R-SC) $1,000 N/A 
 
SENATE 
Total to Democrats: 9,800 
Total to Republicans: 3,000 
 
Senator Donation 
from 
USINPAC 
Vote on 
H.R. 
7081 
Cornyn, John (R-TX) $2,000 Aye 
Dodd, Christopher (D-CT) $2,300 Aye 
Kerry, John (D-MA) $2,500 Aye 
Kyl, Jon (R-AZ) $1,000 Aye 
Martin, James Francis (D-GA) $500 N/A 
Mikulski, Barbara A (D-MD) $1,000 Aye 
Shaheen, Jeanne (D-NH) $1,000 N/A 
Swett, Katrina (D-NH) $500 N/A 
Warner, Mark (D-VA) $2,000 N/A 
 
Aye=Voted in favor of H.R. 7081 
No=Voted against H.R. 7081 
Abstain=Refrained from voting on H.R. 7081 
N/A= Did not vote on H.R. 7081 (not yet elected, not elected, not re-elected, not able to 
vote) 
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